This article considers how the legal and political order of the European Union can cope if the 'Ever Closer Union' envisaged by the Treaties ceases to be inevitable. In particular, it focuses on what are the likely consequences if previously successful integration mechanisms such as integration through law (including adventurous pro-integration interpretation by the CJEU) and functional integration, can no longer successfully push forward the integration process. It considers whether it is possible for the Union to 'stand still', that is, to maintain the current level of integration without either moving forward to more intensive integration or engaging in costly and disruptive disintegration. In order to substantiate this claim, the article looks at three areas, the law of citizenship, the Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing in each case that the neither the current degree of integration nor methods used in recent times to move the integration process forward, provide a long term basis for policy.
Introduction
The topical example of the UK aside, there appears to be little political will in EU states to leave the Union or to reverse the process of European integration. At the same time, there is also a lack of political will for intensive further integration. Could keeping things as they are be a possible solution for the European Union? This article suggests that it could not. There is very limited political appetite for significant further transfers of political and economic powers to the EU. At the same time there is equally, limited support for reversing European integration, for example, by leaving the Euro or abolishing free movement rights. This desire to maintain the status quo would not be a problem if maintaining currently levels of integration were feasible.
However, this article argues that this is not the case. The European Union operates on the basis that its current legal and institutional arrangements are temporary and will be replaced by more integrated versions in the future. Because the current set-up is not designed to be permanent, current structures and levels of integration will tend produce policy incoherence 1 1 For the purposes of this article I define "policy incoherence" as a situation where different EU rules or a combination of EU and national rules, operate at cross purposes, undermining the ability of each to achieve the 2 and unsustainable inflexibility if maintained largely as they are. The Union may therefore struggle to cope if, as some Member States desire, it is decided to maintain current levels of integration indefinitely rather than moving progressively towards ever closer union.
The term "integration" has a range of meanings and the Union over the course of its history has adopted various methods of integration from outright legal harmonisation and extinguishing of the individual competence of Member States in an area, to informal cooperation and coordination mechanisms. For the purposes of this article, I use the term "integration" or "more integration" as referring to a process through which more authority is granted to EU institutions either in the form of the transfer of competence over new areas of policy or by adaptation of decision-making rules so that the means by which decisions in relation to such policy areas are made becomes more supranational with increased capability for Union bodies to make or adapt law and policy without the agreement of all Member States. Central cases of this kind of integration would be instances of the extension of Union competence to new areas (for example by establishing and conferring powers over monetary policy on the European Central Bank), the adaptation of voting rules so that the Union could pass laws on a matter with a qualified majority in the Council rather than by unanimity (as occurred in a wide range of areas in the Lisbon Treaty) or the extension of the rights conferred on individuals or bodies by EU law (as occurred with the passage of legislation expanding the right of EU citizens in the Citizenship Directive 2 or through Court rulings such as Cassis de Dijon 3 which expanded the right of businesses to benefit from mutual recognition of regulatory decisions by Member States). It could also cover conferral of a co-ordinating or reviewing role for EU institutions where none had previously existed though this form is categorised as 'less intense' than other forms.
In order to substantiate its claim, the article looks at three areas, the law of citizenship, the Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing in each case that the current degree of integration cannot provide a long-term basis for policy. The first section sets out a goals intended or where the rules and structures brought about by the degree of integration achieved to date produce otherwise avoidable negative outcomes for the Union and its Member States. of integration that are politically unpalatable such as expansion in the rights granted by EU citizenship or increasing the supranational powers of EU institutions in areas such as economic policy can address the policy problems faced by the Union and its Member States. 6 Neither the newer forms of integration attempted nor 'standing still' i.e. simply maintaining current levels of integration, are not sustainable options because current EU legal principles and decisionmaking structures are based on the assumption that they are merely transitional arrangements that apply pending the realisation of a more supranational and less intergovernmental future.
This is problematic as several Member States and much of the European electorate, even if broadly content with current levels of integration, are not keen on the idea of an ever intensifying increase in integration and in the powers of the Union. 'Standing still' and maintaining existing EU legal rights and levels of integration without moving progressively to more intense integration is not a viable solution. The current distribution of competences between Union and Member States, produces incoherence in policy and excessive rigidity in many areas. By 'incoherence' I mean that this distribution of competences brings about a situation where different EU rules operate at cross purposes, undermining the ability of each to achieve the goals intended or where the rules and structures brought about by the degree of integration achieved to date produce otherwise avoidable negative outcomes for the Union and its Member States.
A degree of incoherence or ineffectiveness is fairly common in a number of polities. What makes the kind of incoherence and ineffectiveness experienced by the Union more grave is that, current arrangements preclude the Union from resolving such incoherence in effective ways. Edmund Burke noted that 'A State without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation'. 7 At current levels of integration, decision-making structures in the Union are exceptionally rigid and do not provide the necessary means of change in law and policy. In order to protect Member State autonomy, they provide so many opportunities to prevent change in EU law that they risk preventing the EU legislature from adapting the law in the very large range of areas that the Union already regulates. New forms of integration, 6 I will refer to this integration in this way as 'intensifying integration' for simplicity's sake. 7 E Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford World Classics, 1993) (L G Mitchell ed.).
notably in relation to the Eurozone have not succeeded in providing the necessary flexibility and may not be applicable to other areas of EU activity. This means that areas such as EU employment law and EU environmental policy, where changing information and changing economic circumstances mean such adaptation can be vital continue to be subject to excessively rigid decision-making structures. In summary, current levels of integration can function so as to produce the need for further unattainable integration and that unmet need can be damaging. The elements of the status quo are actively damaging may not be changeable under current structures. Indeed, even simple adjustment of EU laws that aim only to adapt such laws to changing circumstances and which involve no additional integration may be unattainable under current structures. This must raise significant doubts as to whether current institutional structures can be maintained even if Member States desired to do so.
-The Transitional Nature of Current Structures and the Interpretation of EU Law: Interpreting for the Future
The idea that current institutional and legal arrangements in the EU are merely transitional stages en route to a more integrated future is seen in what is one of the most distinctive features of EU constitutional jurisprudence; its relationship to time. The European Court's jurisprudence has always had a peculiar relationship to time. When constitutional courts in states are required to make rulings on fundamental questions about the structure of the political system or other constitutional norms, they usually approach the relevant legal texts on the basis that those texts reflect (or constitute) what kind of a polity the relevant polity already is, rather than what it aims to become. A constitution will usually be seen as declaring that a state is a parliamentary democracy not that it is destined to become one. 8 Often this 'is' draws on the past in that courts look back to the meaning of as they look to what kind of system was established by a particular constitutional provision. Even in interpreting broad constitutional norms such as the meaning of 'liberty' courts often look to the past. Even where there is no codified constitutional document as in the UK, rulings on key questions such the admissibility of evidence tainted by torture, cited the tradition of the common law as contributing to the current reality of the legal system. 11 There is often an element of aspiration in this invocation of the 'is' and 'was' in that particular traditions or current realities may be regarded as helping to achieve a better future, but this future orientation is less important than identifying traditions from the legal past that contribute to the present.
The European constitutional system is different in this regard. Mancini suggested that the Treaties had a pro-integration 'genetic code' which encouraged, or possibly required, the Court to interpret EU law in a pro-integration manner. 12 The preamble to the Treaty spoke of ' [laying] the foundations of ever closer union' 13 between the peoples of Europe. Thus, the idea that the bodies set up by the treaties were merely foundations of a project that would later be realised 9 See for example, Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 where Kennedy J for the majority based his decision to overturn laws criminalising gay sex on a claim that anti-sodomy statutes were 'far from possessing 'ancient roots'' (p. 570) that 'in our tradition the state is not omnipresent in the home' (p. 563) and invoking 'the laws and traditions of the past half-century' (p. 571-2). In dissent Scalia J reiterated the Court's repeated statement that rights 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' were covered by the 14 th Amendment's protection of liberty (p. 593 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 competences of the Union and the expansion in the use of voting procedures, such as Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, that enhance the supranational nature of the EU. Unlike many federal states where there the boundaries of federal power are largely fixed in a grand bargain between the states and the centre the EU has seen near constant change in the boundaries of its competence with frequent competence-expanding treaty changes over the past 25 years.
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The degree to which the Union's powers are intended to evolve was further underlined by the adoption of the 'passarelle' clause 19 would produce the consensus of apathy which undermined any active interest in or concern for the political process.'
27
However he concludes that, although it is always difficult to show causality in these matters 'it is arguable that functional spill-over created and continues to create come impetus for further integration.' 28 This view has much to recommend it. Although neo-functionalism had underestimated the influence of factors beyond the hoped for economic benefits of integration and although it had not predicted the stop and start nature of the progression of the integration process, it was central to the vision of founders such as Monnet and, notwithstanding various incidents of stagnation or stalling in the integration process, the overall trend of the integration has been for integration in one area to create a need for integration in another and a constant (though not smooth) movement in the direction of further integration.
The fact that this consistent trend towards further integration continued was, to a significant degree, made possible by the role of law in the integration process. As neo-functional integration was not based on mass support it was vulnerable to eruptions of nationalist feeling or when integration touched on any controversial issues. The high degree of political consensus amongst member states in relation to social and economic policy in the post-war period reduced the risk that European integration would become a means by which highly controversial policy agendas were advanced. Such consensus has been declining since the 1970s and has been badly fractured by the current economic crisis. Of course, this is not to say that the question of European integration was not, even in the early decades of the Community, the subject of vigorous political dispute or that voters and politicians were unaware in the early days of the Community that the integration process being launched was highly ambitious and likely, eventually, to touch on highly salient political matters. However, knowledge that, in the future a highly salient political issue such as national defence or budgetary policy may come under a future European polity produces very different political 27 P Craig in P Craig and G. De Burca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1999) 7. 28 Ibid. 5. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 reactions from those produced by attempts to extend in the present, European competence to such matters. Thus, the possibility that the Euro may one day requires a common EU finance ministry is a lot less alarming to electorates and produces much less intense political backlash than a proposal to establish such a ministry today. The early days of the Community were not entirely politically harmonious and vigorous political disputes on matters such as the Common Agricultural Policy, 29 the role of national vetoes 30 and the question of the financing of the Community. 31 However, though these matters were hotly-contested at the time, they were of considerably less political (and electoral) salience than matters such as control of budget deficits and immigration policy which constitute the terrain on which disputes around the boundaries of EU competence are fought out today.
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Because disputes in relation to EU policies and powers did not relate to issues that were matters that were of the utmost salience to electorates and because Western Europe enjoyed relatively high levels of political consensus on socio-economic policy in the early decades of the integration process, there was significant scope for judicial institutions to play a role in unblocking political deadlock without provoking an uncontrollable political backlash. Provided that the relevant matters were not matters of life and death importance to electorates, the politically-insulated nature of the legal process could allow integration to be carried out in a context somewhat shielded from politics and potentially popular invocations of national interests. Indeed, given the counter-majoritarian tendencies of constitutional adjudication (particularly in the context of the EU treaties where a tiny minority (i.e. a single state) could block constitutional change), it is unsurprising that law, and constitutional jurisprudence, were key methods through which integration insulated from political controversy could be achieved. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 instrument of integration. While law is a product of the polity, the polity is also to some extent the creature of the law.' 32 They were correct. European law, both in the form of the Treaty and secondary legislation adopted by European institutions, has been central to moving the integration project forward. This integration has often taken the form of EU legislation or ECJ decisions expanding the scope of EU rights but it has also taken other forms such as informal cooperation and coordination of policies, soft law instruments such as issuing "Guidelines" and, showed how, in the past, the Court has been particularly important in breaking political logjams and has pushed integration forward most intensely when political deadlock stalled the integration process. She also has shown how the ECJ has historically been a notably strategically-minded and political court in the sense that it has used its power to decide cases brought before it in a strategic way in order to promote the legal and political integration of the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Union. 34 For example, famous decisions such as that in Cassis de Dijon 35 had an impact way beyond the specific issue of free movement of goods and the circumstances under which states should recognise each other's regulatory decisions but were also about using EU law to push forward legal, and therefore political, integration between Member States. Indeed the ruling in
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Cassis de Dijon provides a good example of both integration through judicial interpretation and of the operation of the 'spill-over' mechanism. The ruling achieved, by means of creative judicial interpretation, a result that had been politically unattainable. 36 In addition, the ruling promoted a spill-over process. The Court's ruling that Treaty provisions in relation to free movement of goods included a principle of 'mutual recognition' placed a question mark over the status of large amounts of national regulations and thus changed the political incentives of Member States, making it easier to win their agreement to the enactment of European product standards.
The central role of law in European integration has meant the juridification of public life has been particularly strong in the EU. Large areas of public policy such as competition law, became matters of legal rather than political contestation though as Veitch noted, this phenomenon is not restricted to the EU but has been a notable feature of the globalized economy in general.
37
In any event, it suffices to say that the law and its interpretation has been a key method through which ever closer union has been achieved to date without the necessity to achieve majority support amongst EU voters
Limits of Integration through Law and Spill-Over: Political Salience
Just as it was thought that functional integration would bring about popular support for further integration, the process of integration through law was not seen as the end of the integration process. Rather, as Augenstein notes, those who studied and described the phenomenon in the 1980s were of the view that 'law as an agent and object of integration triggers a gradual This has not proved to be the case. Augenstein rightly notes that an emergence of 'socially differentiated transnational communities' has taken place. However, he suggests that this 'casts doubt on the linkage of convergence with an emerging European identity as it 'hardly compares to the more encompassing integration of national societies 'through law' that was envisaged by the Integration through Law school'. 41 We are faced with a situation where the mechanisms of functional integration with spill-over and integration through law, which were intended to resolve the problem of insufficient initial public support for intensive integration, have not produced the sense of shared identity necessary to increase such support. Looking back, the assumption that an 'encompassing integration of societies' would take place seems naïve and deterministic, especially once the Union was expanded from 6 to 28 member states.
Even assuming that the integration process did end up producing economic benefits all-round, it was never a safe bet to assume that politics and loyalty, in Rosamund's words, 'would follow Either way, what is important for my purposes is that the development of European identity and political loyalty to European institutions has not developed to the degree necessary to support intensive further integration between EU member states. At the same time the logic of spill-over (the fact that integration can produce a need for further integration) and Mancini's 'genetic code' of the Treaties that pushes the EU judiciary to interpret them to favour ever closer union, both remain and both encourage a drift towards further integration.
However, this does not mean that these pressures will mean that, notwithstanding a relative lack of support, a continual drift towards further integration will occur. There are reasons to think that the ability of the integration process to proceed with relatively limited public support is coming to an end. Lindberg noted as early as 1966 that integration could cause stress between states when it came to cover more politically salient issues and could thus deter further integration. 46 The end of the 'permissive consensus' under which public opinion did not significantly oppose transfer of power to European institutions came to an end with the conflict over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and has intensified in the decades since. In addition, as integration has deepened, it inevitably begins to touch on more salient issues.
Functional integration and the spill-over it generated could never themselves have been used to integrate emotionally-charged or politically salient areas. Rather they were ways to build support for future moves to carry out integration in such areas. Thus, the functional integration and integration through law encourage and require further integration but in the absence of 'loyalty transference' 47 they may be increasingly incapable of making such integration a reality.
As noted above, although there were intense political disputes during the early decades of the Community, at the time, European institutions did not have significant power over the most salient political issues such as welfare policy or budgetary policy and issues over which it had some influence, such as migration, were not the political hot potatoes they are today. This is not the case today where the boundaries of the integration process now lie across the most salient and controversial areas of political life. Once integration efforts begin to affect more politically salient areas such as welfare policy or budgetary policy the political resistance to 46 Rosamond, n. 25 above at 64. 47 Quoted in Rosamond above, n 25 at. 65-66. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 integration becomes too intense for integration through adventurous judicial interpretation or 'elite led gradualism' to be viable options. In addition, unhappy experience of integration be it at a micro level through an event such as the rapid arrival of large numbers of EU migrant workers in a particular town or at a macro level where the unhappy experience of the Euro, may cause increased resistance to future integration. The reality that popular opinion can prevent integration that the spill-over process actively requires can be seen most notably in Jean-Claude Juncker's comment that the Member State governments knew exactly what they needed to do to resolve the Euro crisis but did not know how to get re-elected once they had done this.
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Viability of Standing Still: Problem 1: Policy Incoherence
If there is potentially insuperably strong resistance to further integration in some areas, might the solution be for Member States to maintain current levels of integration without moving further forward? As mentioned above, a key contention of this article is that a system designed for ever-closer union may struggle to function if integration in the sense of expanding the content of EU legal rights or empowering EU institutions and reducing the scope for member states to block the adoption of laws and policies, comes to a halt. Lindberg 49 noted that an initial degree of integration to achieve a particular benefit could require further integration in order to fully achieve that benefit. Nonetheless, the potential downside of partial integration is not limited to incomplete achievement of a benefit. Partial integration can prove actively damaging and can upset previous compacts between several competing factors in socially and economically important matters. Partial integration can take two forms. The first involves the integrating one policy area (e.g. monetary policy) but leaving another policy area (e.g. fiscal policy) which needs to be closely coordinated with the integrated policy area, in national hands.
The second form involves integrating an area of policy but to an insufficiently supranational degree thus denying Union institutions to power to adapt such policy as necessary by allowing 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 supermajorities for new legislation). In both of these scenarios, the first steps in the integration process were taken on the assumption that they would be followed by further steps (either the expansion of EU competence to other areas or the relaxation of law and policy making rules). If those further steps are not taken, the act of initial integration may impose costs that would otherwise not have been incurred. The first form these costs can take is that of 'policy incoherence' where steps towards integration bring about a situation where the various EU rules or a combination of EU and national rules, operate at cross purposes, undermining the ability of each to achieve the goals intended or where the rules and structures brought about by the degree of integration achieved to date produce otherwise avoidable negative outcomes for the Union and its Member States (such as lower growth and higher unemployment). The second form that costs can take is that of policy rigidity, where once EU law is in place it cannot be adapted as circumstances require due to the large supermajority needed to pass amending legislation. The spill-over mechanism can therefore end up being a net negative by creating extra disruption and suffering that can only be solved by further (politically impossible)
integration.
The next section provides two examples of the first form of cost outlined above. It highlights two key features of the Union's current dilemma. First, it shows that the fact that integration process is now touching on areas that are more politically salient than before (both due to their political and symbolic importance and because of divergence between Member States as to appropriate policy options to pursue) means that previously successful integration mechanisms cannot achieve integration as they could in the past in relation to less salient matters. Second it shows that in each case, the level of integration achieved to date is inherently unstable and can be actively damaging. 25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 significant incoherence in policy. The difficulties in the partially-integrated law on citizenship and welfare rights is mirrored in the second example, the Eurozone where Member States are unable to muster the political will to fulfil the need for integration of fiscal policy that the creation of a single currency created and are left with an actively damaging partially-integrated status quo.
Page 20 of 43
European Law Journal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
EU Citizenship and Social Welfare: Partial Integration Producing Policy Incoherence
In Dano the Court of Justice was faced with a case that touched on the rights of EU citizens to access welfare payments. EU citizenship has been an area where the Court's jurisprudence has been characterised by a commitment to realisation of a more integrated future under which European political and civic identity increases in relative importance and distinctions between citizens of one's own State and those of other Member States are reduced. Judgements in this area have born the mark of the ECJ's unusual relationship to time. As noted above, the Court has repeatedly stated that Union citizenship was 'destined to be the fundamental status' 52 of nationals of Member States, thus focusing its interpretative approach not solely on the current reality of EU citizenship but also on the future role that such citizenship must be developed to play in a more integrated future.
The Court has played a significant role in expanding the rights attached to EU citizenship, including welfare rights. However, previous rulings that expanded welfare rights of EU citizens affected relatively small numbers of people and did not generate much political backlash. has done in relation to the development of citizenship rights in the past but in the Court's perception of how those rights could be developed in the future; it was scaling back its programme to develop EU citizenship into the fundamental status of nationals of Member
States. As will be discussed below, the Court did not wipe out the many existing citizenship rights that have previously been developed by the Court. Thus, the most significant change was not to the past of EU citizenship but to its future. By failing to question on Treaty grounds the limitations established by the legislature to citizenship rights in this area the Court has moved to a position where it regards such limitations no longer merely as temporary restrictions to be progressively removed as EU citizenship moves towards fulfilling its destiny to become the fundamental status of EU citizens.
The problem with this approach to EU citizenship is that it produces the kind of incoherence mentioned above where one set of EU norms operates at cross purposes from other EU or national norms. If such incoherence were a passing teething problem of EU citizenship that would be one thing, but if it is permanent, the costs will be much higher and will have significant consequences for the workability of EU citizenship and its interaction with other legal rules. For example, because the judgment did not reverse existing EU law rights to enter, move and re-enter states, it will be very difficult to actually expel 'illegal migrants' such as Ms.
Dano. The Court has found that Ms. Dano has no right to residence under EU law and therefore no right to social assistance. The German authorities may therefore move to expel here. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 unpredictable nature of politics means nothing can be ruled out. Political pressure may be such that Member States decide to bear the cost of the disruption caused by scaling back citizenship rights drastically. The point of this article is not that such an eventuality would never occur but rather to point out that 'standing still' (neither regressing nor progressing) is not a viable option. In any event, the difficulty of securing even legislative change in this area is shown by the fact that even when the Court of Justice has rendered decisions such as that in Metock 72 which expanded free movement rights in ways opposed by a clear majority of Member States, legislative reversal of the judgment has not been possible.
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The Eurozone: Partial Integration Producing Destructive Policy Outcomes
The dangers to the policy coherence that results when political salience serves to prevent the integration process continuing as the spill-over process requires are not restricted to the specific legal issues raised in Dano. They are representative of the broader challenges facing the Union both in relation to the Eurozone and to the Union's political system more generally.
There can be little doubt that the future of the Eurozone is a highly-salient issue or that this salience is a major impediment to the realisation of the further integration that most observers and most Member State governments believe is necessary to resolve the crisis. As already noted, Jean-Claude Juncker famously said, Member State governments know exactly what they needed to do to resolve the Euro crisis but do not know how to get re-elected once they had done this. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 intergovernmental bodies such as the European Financial Stability Facility 78 and later the the European Stability Mechanism. 79 These bodies were intended to provide loans to Member
States in financial difficulty. The degree to which established EU structures were unable to cope with the challenge is underlined by the fact that such bodies were established on the basis of intergovernmental agreements between Member States outside of the framework of the EU law.
Integration in the area of economic policy has focused on strengthening procedures involving 
Some Recourse to Familiar Methods
Of course, the picture is rather complicated and some of the steps taken do have recognisable traces of forms of integration that achieved success in the past. The Member States have agreed to confer greater powers of supervision of the banking system on the ECB (though tellingly, they have as yet been unable to agree upon a full banking union that would include a common deposit insurance fund or single resolution mechanism for cases when banks fail). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 monetary policy, did not violate the ban on deficit financing and was accordingly not ultra vires. 
A Feasible Solution?
There must be significant doubt as to whether the forms of intergovernmental cooperation provide a sustainable basis for the Eurozone or successfully address the negative outcomes in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 There is no reason to think that such measures had become less necessary in the ensuing three years yet when the Five Presidents (the original four having been joined by the President of the European Parliament) released a further report 88 in 2015 the reduction in the ambition of the measures proposed was striking. As Begg noted 'the more contentious components have been dropped or toned-down in scope. There is no longer any mention of new fiscal capacities nor of debt mutualisation. Instead there is a more vague call to create a 'fiscal stabilisation function', the details of which will be worked out by an expert group to be set up in due course. Principles for fiscal stabilisation include avoiding a system that will result in permanent cross-border transfers -plainly intended to allay the concerns of the creditor countries -as well as ensuring compliance with fiscal rules.'
89
The extent of political resistance to further economic integration is therefore such that the Presidents have ceased even to aim for measures which, three years previously they thought were vital to the survival of the Euro. Therefore, while not quite standing still, the Union has been unable to move forward to the degree necessary to safeguard the Euro or eliminate the costs that an imbalanced monetary union is imposing on Member States. The Union is therefore stuck between the powerful need to integrate fiscal policy to enable to Eurozone economy to function properly and the equally powerful political resistance to the integratiave measures needed to carry this out.
The extensive intergovernmental cooperation achieved is testament to the political 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 policy would have, with a few inevitable bumps in the process, spilled over into integrated fiscal policy but this has not happened. Electorates are sufficiently opposed and sufficiently motivated in their opposition to ensure that such spill over is politically impossible. We remain stuck with what De Grauwe has characterised as 'incomplete monetary union' with mechanisms that are, in his view, too small to provide an effective means of preventing the development of crises of confidence in Member States and are not adequate to allow the Union to respond to economic shocks. 90 Therefore, in relation to the Eurozone, the spill-over mechanism has created the need for a form of integration that is impossible to achieve politically. The failure to achieve that integration results in highly destructive policy incoherence with unduly long recessions and high unemployment in some regions and a general climate of recrimination and resentment. As in the case of free movement rights, moving forward or backwards would be extremely difficult.
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There is no political appetite for either of the measures necessary to resolve the incoherence.
Very few wish to cause the huge disruption or to incur the vast costs that dissolving the currency union would involve. Neither will voters countenance the degree of fiscal union necessary to make the Euro workable. The solution cannot come from the integrative mechanisms previously relied upon. The permissive consensus is over. Electorates are highly engaged in their opposition to fiscal integration, the number of Member States is much higher than in the 1970s and 1908s and there is no consensus as to what economic policy should be even if the EU did manage to gain some authority over it. The Eurozone is as Tim Parkes [EU says, half way across a stream 'unable to complete the transition it has set itself, rather than fording the stream it is sinking in the mud'. 91 Remaning mid-stream, as he rightly notes, is not a solution.
Partial Integration and Legislative Rigidity
If, as I argued, the Eurozone's problems show that the spill-over mechanism, aided by creative judicial interpretations can no longer deliver integration when the areas to be integrated become strongly salient politically in the Member States, we are dependent on the political 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 system of the Union to use its powers to deliver solutions to the policy incoherence brought about by partial integration. Yet, as I have already noted above that in relation citizenship and welfare rights, there is little prospect that any measure capable of resolving the incoherence highlighted by the Dano decision is unlikely to gain the support needed to make it through the legislative system of the Union. Put simply, the Union's law making structures are not sufficiently flexible to allow EU law to be adapted as necessary. Scharpf has written of the 'joint decision trap' noting that where decisions require a large majority or unanimity 'the default provision will always be the status quo' 92 even when this is not anyone's desired outcome. This is a scenario that is particularly likely to arise in the EU.
The Union's legislative system is one that can be said to be 'partially integrated' even in relation to areas where it enjoys full competence. In many multilevel polities the central government has full authority to legislate over the areas ceded by the sub-units to common control. 93 This is not the case in the EU where the rules for enacting or amending legislation provide significant scope for Member States to prevent changes to laws. Many key areas of policy remain subject to unanimity and the institutions established to deal with the Eurozone crisis all require supermajorities for significant decisions. Any treaty change to bring about more fundamental change to alleviate the Eurozone crisis will require unanimous agreement of Member States.
Much has been written about the negative effect of political gridlock in the United States. 94 The
American legislative system has such a proliferation of veto players that amending laws is exceedingly difficult and it is therefore hard for law to be adapted as society's knowledge and needs change. The EU legislative system is even more rigid. European law now covers important areas such as employment law, elements of environmental policy and budgetary matters all of which interact with changing social and economic realities. However, it will be extraordinarily difficult to change these laws even if they are revealed to be damaging to the economic or 92 Discussed in Rosamond, note 25 above, at 61. 93 In US, even the rule requiring 60 votes to close debate on a proposal in the Senate is actually a rule of procedure of the Senate itself rather than a constraint on the ability of the federal government to legislate by simple majority over areas it controls. 94 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Even where a matter is covered by QMV, there is often reluctance in the Council of Ministers to depart with the culture of consensus that has built up over decades and to pass legislation that some Member States strongly disagree with. Even if this is overcome and the Council seeks to adopt legislation by QMV, the majority needed is very high (55% of the states representing 65% of the population of the Union). This is the kind of level of support more akin to the kind of supermajorities needed to amend constitutions in many states. 95 Indeed, Tridimas notes how the difficulties of securing support in the legislative system has made the Union rather dependent on the innovative approach to interpretation of the ECJ. He argues that political deadlock between Member States has often led to the production of 'fudged' or unclear legislative texts, encouraging (and perhaps depending on the Court, to resolve this lack of clarity through adventurous interpretations. 96 The weakness of the EU's political institutions 95 This is a key difference from the German system where state governments in the Bundesrat do have the ability to block some actions of the federal government but where a majority rather than a super-majority is needed to put a measure through the upper house. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 and their need to grant Member States wide scope to block legislative measures has meant that historically, the EU's law-changing abilities were like the senses of a blind person whose hearing developed extra capabilities in order to compensate for the lack of vision. The European judiciary, like the blind person's hearing, has, taken on a role in the development of the law that was beyond that normally given to courts. However, the enhanced hearing ability of a blind person does not fully compensate for the lack of vision and similarly, adventurous interpretation by the Courts is not an adequate substitute for a functioning, flexible political system. The introduction of QMV gave the EU political institutions more 'sight' than before but still much less than the political institutions of a normal polity. If the Court is no longer willing to play the large (and democratically problematic) role in law-making and promoting further integration that it has historically played, the EU maybe left relying on political institutions that are still institutionally incapable of bearing this burden.
Page 36 of 43 European Law Journal
97
The EU's political system must operate by supermajority. Unlike a national parliament whose electorate is bound by a dense national identity that allows a national government to take a decision that may enrich one region and impoverish another without the latter region questioning its authority. Because of the failure of a strong European identity to emerge, the different regions of the EU remain the primary focus of political loyalty. Accordingly, EU political institutions do not have the authority to create winners and losers in the way a national government can. Its system must therefore give scope to Member States to block measures which they feel harm their key interests thus, the EU's political system requires supermajorities for many key decisions. As it operates by supermajority (and often unanimity) this system requires an extraordinary degree of political consensus as to the type of policies that ought to be pursued. As noted above, the level of political agreement on economic matters that existed in early the early decades of the integration process no longer applies. Indeed, the recent rise of populist parties who challenge the centrist Christian and Social Democratic 97 Here a parallel can be drawn to the economic governance of the Eurozone where the absence of adequate fiscal powers at EU level has meant monetary policy has been required to take on a disproportionately large role in dealing with the crisis. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 parties that have long dominated politics in most EU states shows that the degree of political consensus is falling not rising. Therefore, it is not merely the substantive law of the Union that requires further integration to function adequately. The EU's law-making system itself needs to be significantly more supranational than it currently is if the Union is to prove viable and effective as policymaker in the long term. No legal system can hope to react effectively to changing economic circumstances if all of its law is entrenched in a manner similar to constitutional entrenchment at national level making and is therefore extremely difficult to amend. As noted above, Burke's observation 'A State without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation' 98 may well apply to the EU. Member States do not trust each other sufficiently and European citizens are too attached to their nation states to empower European institutions with the necessary legislative rules that would allow EU law to be easily amended. Easy amendment would make it too easy to expand EU powers or for a majority in EU institutions to pass laws inimical to the interests of particular states. National parliaments which benefit (in most Member States) from strong national loyalties, have the authority to take decisions that benefit one region and disfavour another. EU institutions' voting rules reflect the fact that they simply do not have the kind of cultural or political authority to pass or amend laws in ways that make winners of some states and losers of others without losing the allegiance of the latter. On the other hand, in the long term, we cannot have a system where vast areas of law, much of which deals with changing and dynamic areas such as employment law, are effectively unamendable. Current law-making structures are workable only as transitional institutions which pave the way for a more integrated Union where the national vetoes (and even the super majorities that apply to QMV) that make the current system so rigid, are much less common and it is far from clear that such a set-up is an attainable prospect. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Functional integration, the spill-over process and integration through law have helped EU to achieve a very impressive degree of European integration. However, they have also themselves produced the need for further integration that may be politically impossible. As the examples of citizenship rights, the Eurozone and the Union's law making structures show, this unmet need may prove very damaging. The EU now finds itself in something of a catch 22 situation. The electorate in most Member States want neither disintegration nor significantly intensified integration but standing still and maintaining current levels of integration is causing incoherence in policy and is actively destructive in some areas.
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Although it has been criticised, 99 the idea that that European integration is like a bicycle (that it has to be moving forward or it will fall over) appears to be partly correct. I do not mean correct in the sense in which it was used by some of its proponents such as Jacques Delors, as a justification for further integration but rather in that it described the potentially destructive consequences of partial integration. 'Ever closer union' was not just a phrase, as Mancini suggested, it is deep in the DNA of the EU and may be an existential condition for the effectiveness and viability of the Union and its. The methods of integration chosen by those who founded the EEC mean that it is very difficult to call a halt to the integration process but the drop in political support for further integration raises acute dilemmas for the Union by creating demand for just such a stop.
The use of functional integration and integration through law represented ways to get around the fact that integration of politically-salient and emotionally charged areas had insufficient public support. In conjunction with the integrative role played by the law (especially the Court of Justice) a large degree of integration was achieved. However, this could only be a temporary expedient. Spill-over and ever closer union meant that at some stage the integration process would begin to touch on highly salient areas. The sustainability of the integration process at this stage was always going to depend on 'loyalty transference' i.e. the emergence of the degree of European identity and public support for integration that was initially lacking. Whether or not one favours taking further steps in the integration process, one cannot get away from the 99 See for example, T. Garton-Ash 'Europe's Endangered Liberal Order' Foreign Affairs (1998) Vol. 72 51-65, 62. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 reality that many of the steps now completed were made in the assumption that they would be followed by additional steps.
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The collapse of the permissive consensus and progressively more difficult ratification of each successive treaty have shown that this support has not developed. Furthermore, though integration was a success in many areas, in some key areas, such as the Euro, the unhappy experience of integration on the part of many Member States has actively undermined support for further integrative steps. There is low support for a break-up of the Union but there is equally low support for significantly intensified integration. One possible response is to muddle through with various incremental measures that increase integration slowly and thus avoid political backlash. It is not clear that this is feasible long-term solution. As political salience of integrated areas has increased so has political and legal resistance to creeping integration. The 2011 EU Act in the UK required a referendum for any new transfer of power to the Union, no matter how slight 100 and the aim of the British government to remove the commitment to ever closer union from the treaties has relatively high public support in many Member States
101
Indeed, neither the guarantees of the EU Act nor the recognition by other Member States that the UK was not committed to ever closer union was sufficient to avoid a majority vote to leave the Union in the UK's 2016 referendum. These issues are not restricted to problematic Member States such as the UK which was never fully on board with the political integration element of European integration. On the legal front, the German Constitutional Court has been consistently warning that the Union is reaching the outer limits of the incremental integration which it can tolerate. 102 While it is true that, particularly in relation to the Eurozone, Member
States have been experimenting with more inter-governmental forms of integration. However, the degree of integration achieved by these methods is insufficient to remedy the policy problems being caused by the Eurozone's design. In addition, intergovernmental structures are even more prone to paralysis than the already, highly rigid law-making structures that 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 characterise the European Union so provide no solution to problem of the EU's rigidity and inability to effect change.
If further integration is impossible to achieve then reversing the integration process is another option. It is one that would be enormously costly and involve abandonment of the idea of evercloser union that, as the unusual relationship of the Court of Justice's jurisprudence to times shows, has been at the core of the integration project to date. Were it to occur it would represent confirmation of the central thesis of this article, namely that standing still is not a viable option and either further integration or disintegration is required.
Functional integration and integration through law were means by which it was hoped to create facts on the ground that would eventually encourage. As Hoffmann pointed out as far back as 1966, 103 there was a fundamental decision to be taken as to whether the aim of European integration was creation of a further super-state or to go beyond the state as a paradigm for government. The hope was, that decision on this and on the fuller integration of key areas could be put off until the day when integration itself had convinced the peoples of Europe that
intensive integration was what they desired. It seems increasingly likely that that day will never come.
Writing in 1958 at the height of the brutal conflict over Algerian independence, the French 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 the fruitlessness of the French pursuit of an option less radical than recognising Algerian independence, may hold lessons for today's EU leaders. There are circumstances when maintaining the status quo is unsustainable and when decisive actions are the only feasible option. While it was clear in 1958 that France lacked the will to take any of the decisive steps needed to maintain its rule in Algeria, it is not entirely clear that EU Member States lack the will to move the integration process forward to the degree necessary to make EU law-making sufficiently flexible and to resolve the negative outcomes and policy incoherence being caused by partial integration in areas such as the Eurozone and EU citizenship. Eurozone states have taken significant steps to coordinate economic policies and to establish bodies that can provide emergency loans to states in difficulty. However, these steps fall some way short of the kind of decisive measures needed to cure the Eurozone's ills. In addition, there appears to be little or no appetite for fundamental the reconsideration of EU voting rules needed to make the EU a sufficiently flexible policymaker. Member States seem determined to stick with a version of the status quo, taking piecemeal measures that do not satisfactorily address the fundamental issues facing them. Aron's insight was to see that for France, there was no way to avoid a decisive choice and that playing for time may only increase the cost of the inevitable difficult choice to be made. The EU's status quo is not sustainable. Attempting to live in denial of that fact will only make the inevitably hard choices to be made more costly.
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